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Abstract
We show that expansionary monetary policy is associated with higher household portfolio
allocation to high risk assets and lower allocation to low risk assets, in line with “reaching for
yield” behaviour. Our findings are based on analysis of US household level panel data using
two measures of monetary policy shifts over the period 1999-2007. We also show that the
impact of monetary policy changes is stronger for active investors. In addition, our hurdle
model estimates reveal that monetary shocks strongly affect the decision to hold high risk
assets, but not the decision to hold low risk assets. Finally, our results highlight the role of
self-reported risk attitudes as well as that of mortgage-holder status in affecting the response
of household portfolios to monetary policy changes.
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1 Introduction
We show that monetary policy conditions matter for household asset allocation. The recent
experience of historically low interest rates in the US as well as in other countries, has stimulated
a body of research on the effects of monetary policy on financial markets and the real economy.
A widely held view is that by reducing interest rates, central banks have increased the appetite
of investors for risk-taking, the so-called “reaching for yield”, in an effort to improve financial
market conditions and support economic activity. Reaching for yield is a double-edged sword
since it distorts asset allocations in favour of risky assets, a development that can have adverse
consequences for financial stability (Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2012). In the aftermath of the
global financial crisis, policymakers have often called for vigilance regarding emerging risks to
the financial system from highly accommodative monetary policy (Yellen, 2011).1 At the same
time, ultra-low interest rates have depressed returns from savings and have fuelled a debate on
whether they discourage households from saving.
A body of literature has emerged on the important implications of reaching for yield. How-
ever, previous studies typically focus on the behaviour of financial institutions (Jiménez et al.,
2014; Di Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017; Chodorow-Reich, 2014) and little is known about how
households respond to monetary policy conditions. Specifically, it remains unclear as to whether
the composition of households’ portfolios across high risk and low risk assets changes in response
to monetary policy shifts. The main contribution of our paper lies in tackling this question by
conducting empirical analysis of the effects of monetary policy actions on the asset allocation of
US households.
We analyse household-level data drawn from the biennial US Panel Study of Income Dynam-
1The debate on the link between monetary policy and financial stability predates the recent global financial
crisis. A prevalent view among central bankers in the late 1990s to early 2000s was that monetary policy should
not be used to counteract rapid increases in asset prices or credit growth. This was sometimes referred to as the
“Jackson Hall consensus”, and was supported by theoretical and empirical academic work (e.g. Bernanke and
Gertler, 2001). On the other hand, Borio and Lowe (2002), among others, highlighted the dangers for financial
stability from asset prices and credit booms and busts, while Cecchetti et al. (2000) supported a proactive
monetary policy stance when responding to asset price misalignments.
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ics (PSID) over the period 1999-2007, utilising 5 waves of PSID surveys. This information allows
us to explore the allocation of financial assets into low risk (e.g. money in saving accounts) and
high risk (e.g. stocks) categories. Specifically, we explore the determinants of the share of low
risk assets and the share of high risk assets in the household portfolio. The PSID contains an
extensive range of socio-demographic information, which enables us to control for a wide variety
of household characteristics, as is standard in the household finance literature (see, e.g., Guiso
et al., 1996; Dohmen et al., 2011).
Changes in monetary policy are measured using two approaches. The first uses changes in
the effective Federal Funds Rate (FFR) prior to each survey and provides a simple and intuitive
measure of monetary policy shifts that does not rely upon sophisticated econometric analysis.
The second approach uses the methodology of Romer and Romer (2004), as refined by Caglayan
et al. (2017), to obtain unexpected FFR changes. Both approaches are based on the idea that
the FFR is the key US monetary policy indicator, with unexpected FFR changes providing
good estimates of policy shocks, over a long period stretching from the mid-1980s to the recent
financial crisis (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 2004).
Our baseline econometric estimation method is a random effects Tobit model, with portfolio
shares regressed on monetary policy shifts and a range of household and macro-controls. We
find that expansionary monetary policy is associated with higher allocation to high risk assets
and lower allocation to low risk assets. Our empirical evidence suggests that reaching for yield is
not confined to financial institutions, and can also characterise the behaviour of households. A
caveat that may underlie this finding is related to the separation of active portfolio rebalancing
versus passive valuation effects (Bucciol and Miniaci, 2015), since even the portfolio share of a
household with full inertia in its investment behaviour may display variation over time, driven
by valuation changes.
To shed more insight on this issue, we proceed by separating the sample into households
2
classified as active and inactive investors based on their response to a survey question about
buying or selling specific financial assets over the previous year. The previous literature points
out that a minority of sophisticated households (i.e. the wealthy and better educated) tend to
rebalance their portfolios more actively, in contrast to the majority of households who exhibit
considerable inertia (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; Calvet et al., 2009; Bilias et al., 2010).
We find that the monetary policy effects are stronger for active investors. These findings can
be interpreted as suggesting that, while a portion of the overall response of portfolio shares
may be attributed to passive valuation effects, active rebalancing is likely to play an important
role for some households. To address potential selection bias arising from the fact that active
investors are likely to differ systematically from inactive investors, we explore the robustness of
our findings to adopting the Heckman selection estimation approach. The evidence from this
approach is consistent with our previous results: expansionary policy has a positive (negative)
effect on high (low) risk asset shares.2
To further explore the robustness of our findings, we use a double-hurdle estimation method
following Cragg (1971). This is motivated by the fact that zero and non zero values of the asset
shares are included in the sample, since some individuals do not hold any low risk and/or high
risk assets. The double-hurdle approach allows us to evaluate the effects of monetary policy
on whether high and/or low risk assets are held and, conditional on holding an asset type, the
impact of monetary policy on the portfolio share. Interestingly, while the monetary policy effects
on portfolio shares are in line with the baseline findings, an important difference arises in the
selection equation. Specifically, in accordance with intuition, monetary shocks strongly affect
the decision to hold high risk assets, but not the decision to hold low risk assets.
We consider possible mechanisms that can explain the response of household portfolios to
changes in monetary conditions. Our results show that self-reported attitudes towards risk play
2We exclude from our analysis medium risk portfolios given the mix of assets included in this category. However,
medium risk assets do form part of the denominator in the construction of the high and low risk asset shares, as
discussed in Section 2.1
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a key role. Specifically, the relationship between monetary policy shifts and the decision to hold
high risk assets is stronger for households that are more tolerant towards risk. We also show
that the link between the low risk asset share and monetary policy changes is more pronounced
for mortgage-holders relative to non-holders, indicating the significance of household debt in
the transmission of monetary policy. Thus, our household level analysis sheds new light on this
important relationship and points towards explanations related to risk attitudes and secure debt
holdings, which supplement the experimental analysis of Lian et al. (2019).
Our work is relevant to several strands of the existing literature. A key related strand is
concerned with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Previous empirical studies have
examined the behaviour of banks (Jiménez et al., 2014; Delis et al., 2017; Dell’Ariccia et al.,
2017), mutual funds (Hau and Lai, 2016; Di Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017; La Spada, 2018),
and pension funds (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Joyce et al., 2017). These studies typically pro-
vide evidence in support of greater propensity for undertaking riskier investments by financial
institutions when interest rates are low. In addition, empirical evidence demonstrates that ac-
commodative monetary policy reduces the credit spreads of firms (Gertler and Karadi, 2015),
risk premia (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Bianchi et al., 2016) and market-based measures of
risk aversion (Bekaert et al., 2013). The underlying theoretical mechanisms may differ across
studies, but the common thread is that investors respond to expansionary monetary policy by
reaching for yield.3 We contribute to the risk-taking channel literature by empirically modeling
the link between portfolio allocation and monetary policy using household-level data.
In a similar spirit to our paper, Lian et al. (2019) conclude that US household investment
decisions are characterised by reaching for yield when monetary policy is expansive (low short-
3In theoretical models of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, a reduction in the policy rate causes higher
risk-taking by financial institutions, resulting in lower risk premia and amplifying the magnitude of the interest
rate cut. These models highlight the role of leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2010), funding conditions (Drechsler
et al., 2018), and institutional frictions (Acharya and Naqvi, 2019). Moreover, some financial institutions, such as
pension funds, have long-term liabilities which, when discounted at low interest rates, are increasingly difficult to
be met unless more risk is taken on the asset side through higher yielding investments (Lucas and Zeldes, 2009;
Rajan, 2011).
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term interest rates). Nevertheless, their empirical work is conducted at the aggregate level,
rather than the household level, using e.g. Flow of Funds data on household sector flows into
stocks and interest-bearing safe assets. Hence, their econometric analysis cannot account for
household characteristics. The recent study by Luetticke (2018) is also concerned with the
effects of monetary policy shocks on household portfolio choices. However, it focuses on the
choice between liquid and illiquid assets and the potential heterogeneity in portfolio responses
to policy shocks across households with different levels of wealth.4
Our work is also related to the extensive literature on the determinants of household risk
preferences. This literature has typically focused on micro-variables, such as age, gender, level
of education, income and wealth (Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Dohmen et al., 2011). There are a
small number of studies that consider the role of the underlying macroeconomic and financial
conditions but they do not investigate the effects of monetary policy. Such studies have found
that risk preferences, in general, and household asset allocation in particular, are linked to
the economic environment (Christelis et al., 2013), business cycle fluctuations (Bucciol and
Miniaci, 2015), and exposure to past economic and financial crises (Malmendier and Nagel,
2011; Ampudia and Ehrmann, 2017). The empirical findings in this paper are in line with
monetary policy shocks exerting an important effect on risk preferences even after controlling
for micro-characteristics and macro-conditions.
Finally, our work is informative about the effects of monetary policy on saving behaviour.
Theoretically, the effect of interest rates on savings is ambiguous (Attanasio and Weber, 2010).5
4Luetticke (2018) uses repeated cross-sectional data on household portfolios from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). He defines liquid assets to include deposits, cash, debt securities and loans held directly, while
all other real and financial assets are classified as illiquid assets. He finds that sorting households across different
percentiles of net liquid wealth, monetary policy tightening shocks lead to reduction (increase) in the portfolio
liquidity of households below (above) median wealth. Unlike our study, Luetticke (2018) additionally considers
the cross-sectional response of household consumption to monetary policy shocks; see also, among others, Jappelli
et al. (2018) and Cloyne et al. (2019).
5A decrease in the interest rate represents an increase in the price of future consumption (relative to current
consumption), generating an increase in current consumption and a decline in current savings. However, this
substitution effect may be offset by an income effect since, given the lower interest rate, a target level of future
consumption requires more savings. Moreover, a wealth effect, arising from asset revaluation, due to lower interest
rates, can also lead to an increase in consumption and a decrease in saving, reinforcing the substitution effect.
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The empirical evidence on the interest rate elasticity of savings is mixed. Some studies support
the substitution effect (Horioka and Wan, 2007), especially when nominal rates are very low
(Aizenman et al., 2019), while others find little/no effect (Bundesbank, 2015; Beer et al., 2016),
or even a negative relationship consistent with the income effect (Nabar, 2011). Importantly,
many of these studies use data at the macroeconomic level, and therefore cannot shed light on
the behaviour of individual households.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the household survey data
and the measurement of monetary policy shifts. Section 3 presents evidence from the Tobit
estimations exploring the role of monetary policy in influencing household portfolio allocation.
Section 4 analyses the implications of active investment behaviour for the relationship between
monetary policy and household portfolio allocation. Section 5 presents the results from the
robustness analysis using the double-hurdle estimation method to explore whether monetary
policy has different effects on the decision to hold asset types and on the shares of the asset
types held. Section 6 explores various potential mechanisms and discusses the results from
further robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Household-level data
Our household-level data is drawn from the US PSID, a longitudinal survey which began in
1968 and initially included approximately 5,000 families and 18,000 individuals. The PSID has
been used extensively in the existing literature on household finance (Carroll and Samwick,
1998; Hurst et al., 2010; Guiso and Sodini, 2013). Since we are interested in the effects of
monetary policy on household financial portfolios, we focus on the information contained in the
supplementary Wealth Modules, which were collected biennially from 1999 onwards. Specifically,
our analysis covers the following 5 waves of the survey: 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007. The
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sample includes 5,328 households and 15,650 (N × T ) observations.
The information provided in the Wealth Modules allows us to explore the allocation of
financial assets into low risk and high risk categories. Low risk assets are defined from the
responses to the question: ‘Do you [or anyone in your family living here] have any money in
checking or savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings
bonds, or treasury bills, not including assets held in employer-based pensions or IRA’s?’ On
the other hand, high risk assets are defined from the responses to: ‘Do you [or anyone in your
family living here] have any shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or
investment trusts, not including stocks in employer-based pensions or IRA’s?’ We also include
the risky elements of a household’s pension accounts. These are based firstly on the question:
‘Do [you/you or your family living there] have any money in private annuities or Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs)?’ We then use responses to the follow-up question: ‘Are they
mostly in stocks, mostly in interest earning assets, split between the two, or what?’ Based on
the response to the second question, we make the following assumption about how these assets
are allocated. Specifically, if the household reports ‘mostly stocks’, 100% of the value of pension
assets are coded to be high risk assets. This approach is consistent with Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008).6 The definitions of low risk and high risk categories correspond closely to those used in
the seminal contributions of Carroll (2002) and Hurd (2002).7
We aim to explore the impact of monetary policy on the share of assets held in each category,
with the numerator of the low risk (high risk) being defined as the dollar value of all financial
assets held as asset types defined as low risk (high risk) and the denominator for both variables
6Our focus on portfolio shares is in line with the revealed preference strategy for measuring risk preferences
(Guiso and Sodini, 2013). The revealed preference approach can be traced back to the seminal study of Friend and
Blume (1975), where relative risk aversion was derived from household portfolio risky shares reported in surveys.
7Our focus here lies on the effect of monetary policy on the shares of low and high risk assets. It is important
to note that a further group of assets exists, namely, medium risk assets, which form part of the denominator
of the asset shares. The value of which is elicited from the following survey question: Do [you/you or anyone in
your family living there] have any other savings or assets, such as cash value in a life insurance policy, a valuable
collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate that you haven’t already told us about? The total
value of the medium risk assets is defined from the responses to this question plus the value of non-risky pension
accounts, which forms part of the denominator used to construct the asset shares.
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is the dollar value of all financial assets held at the time of the survey. Non-financial assets (e.g.
housing wealth) are not included in the denominator as we control for them in the analysis as
detailed below. Therefore, the values for the low risk and high risk asset shares are constrained
to lie between zero and one. On average and in accordance with our expectations, as shown
in Table 1, the low risk portfolio share is considerably higher (62.7%) than the high risk share
(21.3%). Figure 1 plots the histogram of the low and high risk asset shares, including and
excluding the cases of zero holdings. A key insight from this figure is that most households do
not hold any high risk assets in their portfolios.
The PSID contains an extensive range of household characteristics that are commonly con-
trolled for in the existing household finance literature (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 1996; Guiso and
Paiella, 2008; Dohmen et al., 2011). These include: household net worth, defined as an in-
verse hyperbolic sine transformation of the difference between total assets and total liabilities
including the net value of real estate; total family (household) income in the previous calendar
year; whether the respondent is a homeowner (i.e. whether they or anyone else in the family
living there owns or is buying the home, either fully or jointly); whether the respondent owns
a business or has a financial interest in any business; the head of household’s gender, age, race,
labour market status, education, marital status and self-assessed health.
An important feature of the PSID is that it includes a measure of the head of household’s
risk attitudes based on the 1996 PSID Survey, which includes a risk aversion section. The risk
aversion section contains five questions related to hypothetical gambles with respect to lifetime
income. The series of questions enables us to place individuals into one of six categories of risk
attitudes, where, faced with a 50-50 gamble of doubling income or cutting it by some given
factor, a head of household will accept the risky job if the expected utility from the job change
exceeds that of the utility from remaining with the current job where income is certain (for
full details, see, e.g., Brown et al., 2013; Kimball et al., 2008). We construct a risk tolerance
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index, which can take any integer value between 0 and 5, and is increasing in risk tolerance.
Finally, as the set of risk aversion questions was only asked in 1996, there is no variation in
risk attitudes within households across years, see for instance Schildberg-Hörisch (2018, p.148)
who argues that “individual risk preferences appear to be persistent and moderately stable over
time”. Also, any household joining the panel after 1996 is effectively excluded from the sample.
2.2 The monetary policy measures and the macroeconomic environment
To identify monetary policy shifts, we use two approaches. First, we calculate the average change
in the monthly value of the effective FFR across the two years preceding each survey.8 This
approach has the benefit of simplicity and is consistent with the idea that most households are
not sophisticated enough to rely upon advanced econometric models in order to evaluate the
stance of monetary policy. Second, to isolate the unexpected component of FFR changes, we use
monetary policy shocks that account for the Fed’s response to expected economic conditions.
Policy shocks are calculated using a well-established methodology proposed by Romer and Romer
(2004). The calculation of Romer and Romer’s shocks involves two steps. First, intended FFR
changes around the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings are identified. Second,
the intended FFR changes are regressed on the internal FOMC forecasts for inflation and real
economic activity, i.e. the Greenbook forecasts, around the dates of these forecasts. The residuals
from that regression represent monetary policy shocks. The methodology of Romer and Romer is
further developed by Caglayan et al. (2017) by introducing time-varying parameters and regime
shifts into their model.9
The resulting shocks are plotted in Figure 2, highlighting, for instance, the expansionary
policy surprises of the early 2000s that followed the collapse of the “dot-com” bubble. Our
8There is substantial empirical evidence indicating that the FFR has been the key US monetary policy indicator
since the mid-1980s (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 2004).
9We would like to thank Kostas Mouratidis for sharing the monetary policy shocks data. The frequency of this
data is quarterly and the series ends at 2008Q4. In line with our approach for the simple measure of monetary
policy shifts, we average the quarterly shocks across the two years preceding each survey.
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analysis of the impact of monetary policy shifts on household portfolios focuses on the period
1999-2007. This is motivated by the fact that, while there is wide agreement regarding the
identification of monetary policy shocks before 2007, there is still no consensus on this issue
for the period that includes the 2007-2008 crisis and the ensuing zero lower bound (ZLB).10
Moreover, the existing literature on the effects of monetary policy on financial markets during
the crisis/ZLB period often uses VAR-based (Wright, 2012; Gertler and Karadi, 2015) and/or
event study approaches (Gagnon et al., 2011; Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012) along with high-frequency
data. These methods are not compatible with the lower frequency at which the household survey
data are available.11
Finally, in our estimations we control for macroeconomic conditions using the average quar-
terly percentage change in Real GDP over the two years that precede each survey. For robustness,
we also use the average of the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) across the two
years before each survey. The CFNAI is a monthly index designed to gauge overall economic
activity, and related inflationary pressures, by combining 85 existing monthly indicators.
3 Modelling asset shares in household portfolios
We firstly model the portfolio shares observed in the unbalanced panel of data drawn from the
PSID, denoted by yit, as censored outcomes via a random effects Tobit specification, across
households i = 1, ..., N and time t = 1, ...5, for the time period 1999-2007. We estimate a set of
10 The financial crisis had a significant impact on the Fed’s approach to monetary policy implementation.
Following a series of FFR cuts, commencing in Autumn 2007, the ZLB was reached by the end of 2008 and
the Fed resorted to non-conventional monetary policy tools. It provided assurances about the intention to keep
the FFR at the ZLB and aimed to put downward pressure on long-term rates through changes in the size and
composition of its balance sheet.
11In additional results (available upon request) we extend the sample period to 2015, using changes in the
shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2016) from January 2009 onwards, and obtain evidence similar to the pre-crisis
period. Some studies support the shadow rate as a measure of the monetary policy stance at the ZLB (Wu and
Xia, 2016; Bullard, 2012), nevertheless this remains an area of debate in the literature.
10
specifications based on an equation as follows:
y∗it =X
′
itβ +M
′
tγ + πrt + ǫit (1)
where y∗it denotes the underlying latent propensity to hold asset shares, Xit is a vector of
household and head of household covariates as described in Section 2.1 and β is the associated
parameter vector, Mt is a vector of macroeconomic controls and γ is the associated parameter
vector, rt is the measure of monetary policy as defined in Section 2.2, αi is a household-specific
random error and ǫit is a white noise error term. Hence, π is our key parameter of interest,
which captures the relationship between monetary policy and household portfolio allocation.
The observed asset share variable, yit, is such that:
yit =


y∗it if 0 < y
∗
it < 1
0 if y∗it ≤ 0
1 if y∗it ≥ 1
(2)
If the latent propensity is negative or zero, we observe households at zero, if the latent
propensity is greater than or equal to 1, we observe households at 1, otherwise the observed
shares equal the latent propensity (yit = y
∗
it). Accordingly, this model is estimated as a Tobit
model with censoring from below at zero and above at 1.
Prior to including any macroeconomic and monetary policy controls, in Table 2, we present
the marginal effects for all microeconomic determinants for the low risk share and high risk share
equations. These controls are included in all models presented in the paper, but, for brevity, we
only present them in full in Table 2. In general, the findings tie in with previous studies with
risk tolerance, income and net worth being positively (negatively) related to the share of high
11
(low) risk assets held. This is also the case for home and business ownership. Households with
heads at the early stages of the lifecycle appear to be less inclined to hold high risk assets, as
is also the case for being non-white and having relatively low levels of education. These effects
accord with intuition as well as the existing literature (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 1996; Guiso and
Paiella, 2008; Ampudia and Ehrmann, 2017).
Table 3 reports estimates of the model described in Equation 1 above, which includes the
monetary policy measures and other macroeconomic controls. With respect to the macroeco-
nomic controls, we explore three different specifications: in the first specification, we do not
include them (Panel A); the second specification controls for past GDP growth (Panel B); in the
third specification, we replace GDP growth with the CFNAI (Panel C). Finally, we estimate a
fourth specification which does not incorporate macroeconomic controls but includes time fixed
effects (Panel D).
Across all panels in Table 3, the two measures of monetary policy, capturing actual FFR and
unexpected FFR changes (RR shock), are statistically significant at the 1% level. The negative
sign of the estimated π for the share of high risk assets indicates that expansionary monetary
policy, as captured by interest rate cuts, is associated with higher allocation to high risk assets.
In contrast, monetary easing is associated with lower allocation to low risk assets (π>0). These
findings are in line with the argument that low interest rates discourage households from saving,
while encouraging them to hold relatively risky assets in accordance with reaching for yield
behaviour.
The magnitude of π does not differ substantially across the actual and unexpected interest
rate changes. For example, in the case of the high risk share in Panel A, the marginal effects
for FFR changes and the Romer and Romer shocks are -0.113 and -0.165, respectively. The
robustness of this pattern of results to the inclusion of the macroeconomic controls is particularly
noteworthy. The findings in Panels B and C indicate that a growing economy is associated with
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a higher (lower) share of high (low risk) assets. In addition, the effect of monetary policy remains
highly significant and increases in magnitude when time fixed effects replace the macroeconomic
controls. Overall, our findings, which are consistent with reaching for yield behaviour amongst
households, are consistent across a range of specifications.12
4 Active versus inactive investors
4.1 Splitting the sample into active and inactive investors
The main finding of our analysis so far is that expansionary monetary policy is associated with
higher allocation to high risk assets and lower allocation to low risk assets in household financial
portfolios. There is a potential important caveat, however, related to the fact that portfolio
shares may be shifting over time not only due to active portfolio rebalancing but also as a result
of passive valuation effects (Bucciol and Miniaci, 2015). Thus, the increase in the share of high
risk assets following expansionary policy shifts may reflect the increase in the value of stock-
holdings, as opposed to, or in addition to, active portfolio rebalancing towards stocks. Generally,
even the portfolio share of a household characterised by full inertia in its investment behaviour
may display variation over time, driven by valuation changes.
In order to gain further insight on this issue, we divide the sample into households classified
as active and inactive investors, and re-estimate the models for these two categories separately.13
Active investors are defined as households which indicate that someone (in the household) has
bought or sold ‘any shares of stock in publicly held corporations, stock mutual funds, or invest-
ment trusts, including any automatic reinvestments not including any IRAs’ over the previous
year. They correspond to 13% of the sample, while the rest are classified as non-active. This low
proportion is in line with previous studies which report that, whereas the majority of households
12Our findings are robust to including the means of time varying household covariates.
13We also attempted to control for valuation changes by adding past stock market returns to the set of controls,
as defined by the average monthly stock market return for the two years preceding the survey data. The pattern
of results discussed in Section 3 is robust to its inclusion. The results are available on request.
13
exhibit inertia in their investment behaviour, a minority of sophisticated households (i.e. the
wealthy and the better educated) engage in more active portfolio rebalancing (Brunnermeier
and Nagel, 2008; Calvet et al., 2009; Bilias et al., 2010).
Tables 4 and 5 report the Tobit estimates for active and non-active investors, respectively.
The monetary policy effects remain highly significant with the monetary policy measures con-
sistently being positively associated with the low risk asset share and inversely associated with
the high risk asset share. Furthermore, there are some interesting differences in the magnitude
of the effects, with the results highlighting a stronger role of monetary policy shifts for the
case of active investors. The sensitivity of the asset shares to monetary policy shifts for active
investors is twice the magnitude, or more, relative to that of inactive investors. For example,
focusing on the results in Panel B of Tables 4 and 5, the estimated π of the low risk share when
the Romer and Romer shocks are considered is 0.335 for active investors compared to 0.173 for
non-active investors. For comparison, the overall response of the low risk share in Table 3 Panel
B (0.261) lies in the middle of the aforementioned responses of active and non-active investors.
The stronger sensitivity of active investors to such monetary policy shifts is consistent with
the view that, while a portion of the overall response of portfolio shares may be attributed to
passive valuation effects, an important component of that response may be driven by a minority
of sophisticated and financially literate households.
4.2 Controlling for potential sample selection bias
Since active investors are likely to differ systematically from inactive investors, selection bias
may arise in splitting the sample as in the previous section. To address such potential bias,
we adopt the Heckman selection estimation approach for the sample of active investors only.
The first stage models the probability of being an active investor, the results of which are used
to calculate the inverse mills ratio term included in the second stage asset share equations to
control for potential sample selection bias. Specifically, we re-estimate our share equations, with
the standard errors clustered at the household level, for the sample of active investors only, as
follows:
yit =X
′
itβ +M
′
tγ + πrt + λδit + ǫit (3)
where δit = φ(Hit)/Φ(Hit) is the standard inverse mills ratio term estimated from a probit
model used to determine the probability of being an active investor, Hit = Φ
−1(Pit) and Pit
denotes the predicted probability of household i at time t having an active investor in the
household, φ(.) represents the probability density function of the standard normal distribution
and Φ(.) denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. rt is the
measure of monetary policy as previously defined and π is the coefficient of interest.
In addition to the set of controls in the probit model (Xit and Mt), a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the household has received a financial windfall is included as an over-identifying
instrument in the selection equation. Our instrument indicates whether the household has re-
ceived a financial windfall during the previous two years in the form of an inheritance or gift
worth $10, 000 or more. As with all such sample selection corrections, the key issue lies in select-
ing a suitable identifying instrument for the first stage, specifically a variable which influences
the probability of being an active investor but does not influence the shares of high risk and low
risk assets held. We further comment on instrument validity below.
Table 6 presents the Heckman estimation results from modelling the low risk asset share
(Panel A) and the high risk asset share (Panel B) across the four different specifications related
to the inclusion of the macroeconomic controls and time fixed effects. The coefficients for
the macro-controls are not shown for brevity, but available upon request. From the second
stage regression, we can see that the Heckman results are in line with our previous evidence
with expansionary monetary policy shifts increasing (decreasing) the share of high (low) risk
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assets in household portfolios.14 Regarding the validity of the chosen instrument, the first stage
regression results show that the windfall variable is statistically significant thereby supporting
its validity.15
5 The decision to hold assets types and the amount held
As we saw in Figure 1, the majority of households do not hold high risk assets. Indeed, the
‘stock-holding puzzle’ whereby households appear disinclined to hold risky assets even in the
presence of a historical equity premium, is well-known in the existing literature (Haliassos and
Bertaut, 1995). The inclusion of households with zero holdings of high risk assets in our analysis
may lead to biased estimates of the effect of monetary policy on portfolio allocation.16 Motivated
by this issue, we explore the robustness of our findings to using the double-hurdle estimation
method (Cragg, 1971). This approach allows us to examine the impact of monetary policy
shifts on the two different parts of the distribution of the asset share variables. Specifically, we
can evaluate the monetary policy effects on whether high and/or low risk assets are held and,
conditional on holding an asset type, the amount of the asset share held. The hurdle model is
defined by Yit = (Sit × Y
∗
it), where Yit is the observed outcome of the dependent variable, i.e.
the asset share:
Sit = 1(X
′
1itβ1 +M
′
tγ1 + πrt + ǫ1it > 0) (4)
Y ∗it = X
′
2itβ2 +M
′
tγ2 + πrt + ǫ2it (5)
14Table A1 in the Appendix presents OLS estimates of Equation 1 for low and high risk asset shares to facilitate
comparison with the Heckman estimates.
15If included in the asset share models, we find that the windfall variable is statistically insignificant thereby
further endorsing its use as a first stage instrument.
16It is important to acknowledge that in the Tobit analysis presented in Section 3, zero and non zero values of
the asset shares are included in the estimations. Hence, the findings reveal the effect of monetary policy on the
expected value of the asset share, which could be operating at zero or positive values of the asset share.
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The selection variable is given by Sit, which equals one if the dependent variable is not
bounded (i.e. the household holds the asset type) and is zero otherwise, where X1it is a vector
of covariates, which influence the probability of holding the asset type. The continuous outcome
is a latent variable Y ∗it . This is only observed if Sit = 1, i.e. if the household holds that type
of asset. The outcome in Equation 5 is a linear model, where X2it is a vector of explanatory
variables which influence this part of the distribution. To identify the model, we follow Section
4.2 and control for receiving a financial windfall during the previous two years in the form of an
inheritance or gift worth $10,000 or more in the selection equation, i.e. in X1it. Standard errors
are clustered at the household level.
The results from estimating the hurdle models are presented in Tables 7 Panel A (low risk
asset share) and Panel B (high risk asset share), where in each panel the upper set of results
relates to the continuous part of the distribution, while the lower set relates to the selection
part of the model. It is apparent that the measures of monetary policy shifts are positively
(negatively) associated with the continuous part of the low (high) risk asset share distribution
across all specifications. Hence, the monetary policy effects on household portfolios are in line
with the baseline findings from the Tobit analysis. However, an important difference between
high and low risk assets arises in the effects of monetary policy shifts on the participation equa-
tion. Specifically, while monetary policy changes strongly affect the decision to hold high risk
assets, the corresponding impact on low risk assets is typically statistically insignificant across
the various specifications. These findings suggest that the participation decision is influenced
by factors other than monetary policy for the case of low risk assets.
6 Potential mechanisms
In the final part of our empirical investigation, we consider potential mechanisms that lie behind
our results. We start by checking whether particular household characteristics strengthen, or
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weaken, the response of asset shares to monetary policy shifts. Given the important role of risk
attitudes in the household finance literature, we re-run the double hurdle models, which reveal
the effects of monetary policy at the two different parts of the asset share distributions, across
three groups of households according to the self-reported risk tolerance variable. Risk Attitude
1 represents the least risk tolerant group, while Risk Attitude 3 is the most risk tolerant group,
according to the household’s response to the risk aversion section of the 1996 PSID survey.17
The results in Table 8 suggest that the link between monetary policy shifts and the decision
to hold high risk assets is stronger for households that are more tolerant towards risk.18 For
example, using the Romer and Romer shocks the magnitude of the monetary policy impact in
the selection equation more than doubles when we switch from Risk Attitude 1 to 3 (-0.406 to
-0.949). At the same time, and in line with the previous evidence in Table 7, the results in Table
9 indicate that the participation decision for low risk assets is not explained by monetary policy
shifts.
We then re-run our double hurdle analysis splitting the households into those who hold a
mortgage and those who do not hold a mortgage.19 This analysis is motivated by the idea that
households with a mortgage may be more informed about the prevailing interest rate as well as
about possible changes in the near future. Recent evidence by Cloyne et al. (2019) indicates
that the aggregate response of consumption to interest rates is driven by mortgage-holders,
highlighting the role of household debt in the transmission of monetary policy. Our findings
in Table 9 reveal that the response of the low risk asset share is stronger for mortgage-holders.
For instance, the coefficient associated with actual changes in the FFR is 0.321 for households
without a mortgage and 0.830 for those with a mortgage. On the other hand, the response of
the high risk asset share to monetary policy shifts does not exhibit substantial variation across
17Risk Attitude 1 includes the households with risk tolerance index 0 and 1. In a similar fashion, Risk Attitude
2 (3) includes households with risk tolerance index 2 and 3 (4 and 5).
18The results presented in this section always include the CFNA as a macro-control. The coefficients of CFNAI
(available upon request) are not presented for brevity.
19We re-iterate here that housing assets and liabilities are controlled for in our measure of net worth.
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mortgage holders versus non-holders.20
Although we have explored two potential mechanisms, namely risk attitudes and mortgage
holding, another potential mechanism that could be at work is related to preferences and psy-
chology, reflecting differences in the perception and evaluation of the risk-return trade-offs in
different interest rate environments. As Lian et al. (2019) point out, reference dependence and
salience are key in explaining the stronger preference for risky assets when interest rates are
low. The former implies that individuals experience discomfort when the risk-free interest rate
falls below the reference point for investment returns, while the latter emphasizes the role of
proportional thinking.21 Given the nature of our dataset this channel cannot be explored further
but it remains an interesting avenue for further research.
7 Conclusions
This study shows that expansionary monetary policy is associated with higher household port-
folio allocation to high risk assets and lower allocation to low risk assets. We employ PSID data
on US household financial portfolios along with two measures of monetary policy shifts, based
on actual and unexpected changes in the FFR, over the period 1999-2207. Our econometric
approach encompasses Tobit estimation for the baseline analysis, sample splits and Heckman
estimates to account for the effects of active investments, as well as double-hurdle estimation,
to explore differences in the effects of monetary policy on the decision to hold low and/or high
risk assets, and on the shares of the asset types held.
Our evidence for active investors reveals that the impact of monetary policy changes is
stronger, relative to non-active ones, which is in line with the view that passive valuation effects
on their own cannot fully explain the overall changes in household portfolio shares. The hurdle
20We have also experimented with splitting the sample by other household characteristics and our results
(available upon request) do not reveal any important role in terms of identifying a heterogenous response to
monetary policy shifts.
21For example, 6% average returns on the risky asset relative to 1% risk-free returns may appear more attractive
than 10% average returns relative to 5% risk-free returns.
19
estimates show that the decision of households to hold low risk assets and the decision to hold
high risk assets are not affected by monetary conditions in a similar manner. The former
appears to be unrelated to monetary policy factors, while the latter is strongly affected by
monetary policy shifts, especially in the case of households that are more tolerant towards risk.
Furthermore, our findings highlight the role of mortgage-holder status in amplifying the response
of low risk asset shares to monetary policy changes.
This study brings together two important strands of the existing literature, related to the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy and household financial portfolios. It informs and extends
both strands by demonstrating the existence of an empirical link between household portfolio al-
location and monetary policy shifts. This link suggests that, in addition to financial institutions,
households may also reach for yield. Our findings have important policy implications since they
empirically verify the intuitive view of policymakers related to reaching for yield on the part
of households. Our findings suggest that this type of behaviour should be accounted for when
calibrating the appropriate monetary policy response to economic and financial developments.
Finally, our findings suggest several avenues for future work. For example, one could examine
whether these results hold in a non-US context.
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Figure 1: Households portfolios asset shares
27
Figure 2: Monetary policy variables
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Table 1: PSID descriptive statistics
Mean St. Dev.
Low risk 0.627 0.413
High risk 0.213 0.325
Female 0.231
Age 16-29 0.177
Age 30-39 0.224
Age 40-49 0.274
Age 50-59 0.21
Age 60-69 0.079
Age 70+ 0.036
White 0.764
Employed 0.867
Retired 0.067
Married 0.599
Divorced 0.186
Widowed 0.029
High school and above 0.932
Business owner 0.159
Homeowner 0.705
Health index 2.792 0.967
Log income 11.177 0.809
Log networth 9.765 7.047
Risk index 1.862 1.612
Observations 15,650
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Table 2: Micro determinants of households portfolios - Marginal
effects
Low risk asset share High risk asset share
Female 0.00637 -0.0277
(0.0251) (0.0261)
Age 16-29 0.267*** -0.119**
(0.0472) (0.0484)
Age 30-39 0.178*** -0.0354
(0.0444) (0.0454)
Age 40-49 0.0699 0.0439
(0.0431) (0.0442)
Age 50-59 -0.0288 0.105**
(0.0423) (0.0433)
Age 60-69 -0.0369 0.0825**
(0.0396) (0.0408)
White -0.247*** 0.329***
(0.0203) (0.0214)
Employed -0.0285 -0.00254
(0.0259) (0.0270)
Retired -0.0775** 0.101***
(0.0362) (0.0371)
Married 0.00768 -0.0361
(0.0264) (0.0271)
Divorced 0.0795*** -0.0752***
(0.0280) (0.0290)
Widowed -0.0383 -0.0096
(0.0515) (0.0538)
High school -0.258*** 0.342***
(0.0357) (0.0399)
Business owner -0.0687*** 0.0563***
(0.0175) (0.0172)
Homeowner -0.0571*** 0.0429**
(0.0184) (0.0190)
Health index -0.0232*** 0.0458***
(0.00728) (0.00746)
Log income -0.126*** 0.143***
(0.0106) (0.0108)
Log networth -0.0219*** 0.0170***
(0.00116) (0.00124)
Risk index -0.0127** 0.0201***
(0.00530) (0.00538)
Constant 3.028*** -2.735***
(0.122) (0.128)
σu 0.454*** 0.442***
(0.00936) (0.00969)
σe 0.503*** 0.460***
(0.00523) (0.00535)
Observations 15,650 15,650
Notes: This table presents estimates of the household level determinants of the low and high risk asset shares.
All regressions are based on a random effects Tobit model, where the dependent variable is constrained to
be between zero and one. We report the number of households in the sample (N), the maximum number of
time periods (T) and the total number of observations (N x mean(T)). The output shown in the table refers
to the average marginal effect (AME) of a one point change of the explanatory variable in question on the
expected value of the dependent variable. Standard errors pertaining to these AMEs are shown in brackets.
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Table 3: Households portfolios and monetary policy
Low risk asset share High risk asset share
Panel A: No macro controls
FFR 0.138*** -0.113***
(0.018) (0.014)
RR shock 0.227*** -0.165***
(0.030) (0.024)
N 5,328 5,328 5,328 5,328
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650
Panel B: GDP growth
FFR 0.283*** -0.241***
(0.022) (0.018)
RR shock 0.261*** -0.195***
(0.031) (0.025)
GDP -0.023*** -0.010*** 0.02*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
N 5,328 5,328 5,328 5,328
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650
Panel C: CFNAI
FFR 0.317*** -0.255***
(0.030) (0.024)
RR shock 0.237*** -0.168***
(0.033) (0.026)
CFNAI -0.068*** -0.005 0.054*** 0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
N 5,328 5,328 5,328 5,328
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650
Panel D: Year fixed effects
FFR 0.614*** -0.538***
(0.045) (0.036)
RR shock 0.626*** -0.549***
(0.046) (0.037)
N 5,328 5,328 5,328 5,328
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650
Notes: This table presents estimates of Equation 1 for the low and high risk asset shares. All
regressions are based on a random effects Tobit model, where the dependent variable is constrained
to be between zero and one. Each regression includes a set of micro determinants as in Table 2.
We report the number of households in the sample (N), the maximum number of time periods (T)
and the total number of observations (N x mean(T)). The output shown in the table refers to the
average marginal effect (AME) of a one point change of the explanatory variable in question on the
expected value of the dependent variable. Standard errors pertaining to these AMEs are shown in
brackets.
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Table 4: Households portfolios and monetary policy - Ac-
tive investors
Low risk asset share High risk asset share
Panel A: No macro controls
FFR 0.193*** -0.243***
(0.039) (0.047)
RR shock 0.310*** -0.301***
(0.061) (0.074)
N 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 2,900 2,900 2,900 2,900
Panel B: GDP growth
FFR 0.428*** -0.528***
(0.045) (0.054)
RR shock 0.335*** -0.328***
(0.061) (0.074)
GDP -0.038*** -0.018*** 0.048*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
N 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 2,900 2,900 2,900 2,900
Panel C: CFNAI
FFR 0.469*** -0.550***
(0.059) (0.070)
RR shock 0.332*** -0.319***
(0.063) (0.076)
CFNAI -0.110*** -0.018 0.126*** 0.015
(0.018) (0.012) (0.021) (0.0155)
N 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 2,900 2,900 2,900 2,900
Panel D: Year fixed effects
FFR 1.046*** -1.329***
(0.087) (0.104)
RR shock 1.068*** -1.356***
(0.089) (0.106)
N 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 2,900 2,900 2,900 2,900
Notes: This table presents estimates of Equation 1 for the low and high risk portfolio shares,
selecting households classified as active investors. All regressions are based on a random effects
Tobit model, where the dependent variable is constrained to be between zero and one. Each re-
gression includes a set of micro determinants as in Table 2. We report the number of households
in the sample (N), the maximum number of time periods (T) and the total number of observations
(N x mean(T)). The output shown in the table refers to the average marginal effect (AME) of a
one point change of the explanatory variable in question on the expected value of the dependent
variable. Standard errors pertaining to these AMEs are shown in brackets.
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Table 5: Households portfolios and monetary policy - Non-
active investors
Low risk asset share High risk asset share
Panel A: No macro controls
FFR 0.121*** -0.089***
(0.020) (0.014)
RR shock 0.156*** -0.081***
(0.035) (0.026)
N 4,991 1,437 4,991 4,991
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 12,716 2,900 12,716 12,716
Panel B: GDP growth
FFR 0.211*** -0.144***
(0.025) (0.019)
RR shock 0.173*** -0.086***
(0.036) (0.027)
GDP -0.014*** -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 12,716 12,716 12,716 12,716
Panel C: CFNAI
FFR 0.214*** -0.119***
(0.035) (0.026)
RR shock 0.132*** -0.039
(0.038) (0.029)
CFNAI -0.035*** 0.010 0.011*** 0.016
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
N 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 12,716 12,716 12,716 12,716
Panel D: Year fixed effects
FFR 0.394*** -0.248***
(0.052) (0.040)
RR shock 0.402*** -0.253***
(0.053) (0.041)
N 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991
Max T 5 5 5 5
Observations 12,716 12,716 12,716 12,716
Notes: This table presents estimates of Equation 1 for the low and high risk portfolio shares,
selecting households classified as non-active investors. All regressions are based on a random ef-
fects tobit model, where the dependent variable is constrained to be between zero and one. Each
regression includes a set of micro determinants as in Table 2. We report the number of households
in the sample (N), the maximum number of time periods (T) and the total number of observations
(N x mean(T)). The output shown in the table refers to the average marginal effect (AME) of a
one point change of the explanatory variable in question on the expected value of the dependent
variable. Standard errors pertaining to these AMEs are shown in brackets.
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Table 6: Households portfolios and monetary policy - Heckman selection model
Panel A: Low risk asset share
No macro controls GDP growth CFNAI Year fixed effects
2nd Stage
FFR 0.219*** 0.470*** 0.517*** 1.149***
(0.048) (0.063) (0.078) (0.119)
RR shock 0.342*** 0.363*** 0.364*** 1.171***
(0.077) (0.085) (0.081) (0.123)
1st stage (Active)
Windfall -0.108*** -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.107*** -0.103***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616
ρ 0.056 0.031 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.021 0.014 0.009
ρ (p-value) 0.635 0.785 0.998 0.921 0.915 0.751 0.831 0.879
Panel B: High risk asset share
No macro controls GDP growth CFNAI Year fixed effects
2nd Stage
FFR -0.253*** -0.567*** -0.606*** -1.355***
(0.052) (0.063) (0.084) (0.120)
RR shock -0.333*** -0.363*** -0.360*** -1.404***
(0.094) (0.084) (0.088) (0.125)
1st Stage (Active)
Windfall -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.107*** -0.103***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 0.012
Observations 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616 15,616
ρ 0.038 0.062 0.109 0.089 0.090 0.073 0.078 0.282
ρ (p-value) 0.692 0.491 0.152 0.492 0.267 0.397 0.346 0.087
Notes: The table reports the results of the Heckman estimations for Eq. 3. Both the selection equation and the outcome equation includes a set of micro
determinants as in Table 2. ρ is the coefficient of correlation between the first- and the second-stage errors. S.E. are clustered at the household level.
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Table 7: Households portfolios and monetary policy - Hurdle models
Panel A: Low risk asset share
No macro controls GDP growth CFNAI
FFR 0.249*** 0.474*** 0.584***
(0.030) (0.040) -0.055
RR shock 0.432*** 0.489*** 0.466***
(0.050) (0.056) (0.060)
Selection equation
FFR 0.243 0.586*** 0.503*
(0.160) (0.204) (0.271)
RR shock 0.290 0.361 0.274
(0.290) (0.286) (0.307)
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650
Panel B: High risk asset share
No macro controls GDP growth CFNAI
FFR -0.111*** -0.436*** -0.540***
(0.036) (0.05) (0.060)
RR shock -0.307*** -0.397*** -0.413***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.067)
Selection equation
FFR -0.642*** -1.081*** -1.048***
(0.080) (0.104) (0.140)
RR shock -0.753*** -0.816*** -0.628***
(0.136) (0.140) (0.150)
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650
Notes: The table reports the coefficients for the model in Equations 4 and 5. Each regression includes a set of micro determinants as
in Table 2. The instrument in the selection equation is an inheritance or gift worth 10, 000. S.E. are clustered at the household level.
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Table 8: Household’s portfolios and monetary policy - Hurdle models and the role of risk
attitudes
Panel A: Low risk asset share
Risk Attitude 1 Risk Attitude 2 Risk Attitude 3
FFR 0.516*** 0.661*** 0.665***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
RR shock 0.389*** 0.558*** 0.556***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.14)
Selection equation
FFR 0.519 0.547 0.502
(0.39) (0.50) (0.57)
RR shock 0.446 0.512 -0.380
(0.43) (0.56) (0.70)
Observations 7,462 7,462 5,074 5,074 3,114 3,114
Panel B: High risk asset share
Risk Attitude 1 Risk Attitude 2 Risk Attitude 3
FFR -0.540*** -0.635*** -0.423***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
RR shock 0.369*** -0.578*** -0.255*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
Selection equation
FFR -0.783*** -1.176*** -1.437***
(0.20) (0.25) (0.31)
RR shock -0.406* -0.745*** -0.949***
(0.22) (0.26) (0.33)
Observations 7,462 7,462 5,074 5,074 3,114 3,114
Notes: The table reports the coefficients for the model in Equations 4 and 5. Each regression includes a set of micro determinants
as in Table 2. The instrument in the selection equation is an inheritance or gift worth 10, 000. S.E. are clustered at the household
level.
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Table 9: Household’s portfolios and monetary policy - Hurdle
models and the role of mortgages
Panel A: Low risk asset share
Mortgage Non-Mortgage
FFR 0.830*** 0.321***
(0.09) (0.07)
RR shock 0.632*** 0.301***
(0.09) (0.08)
Selection equation
FFR 0.387 0.747
(0.32) (0.51)
RR shock 0.157 0.514
(0.36) (0.57)
Observations 11,035 11,035 4,615 4,615
Panel B: High risk asset share
Mortgage Non-Mortgage
FFR -0.535*** -0.529***
(0.07) (0.18)
RR shock -0.411*** -0.355*
(0.07) (0.20)
Selection equation
FFR -1.098*** -0.961***
(0.16) (0.29)
RR shock -0.592*** -0.804**
(0.17) (0.32)
Observations 11,035 11,035 4,615 4,615
Notes: The table reports the coefficients for the model in Equations 4 and 5. Each regression
includes a set of micro determinants as in Table 2. The instrument in the selection equation is an
inheritance or gift worth 10, 000. S.E. are clustered at the household level.
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Appendix
Table A1: OLS estimation low and high risk asset shares and monetary
policy (Actives)
Panel A: Low risk asset share
No GDP GDP Growth CFNAI
1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007
FFR 0.221*** 0.470*** 0.521***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
RR shock 0.351*** 0.366*** 0.373***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
N 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900
Panel B: High risk asset share
No GDP GDP Growth CFNAI
1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007
FFR -0.252*** -0.542*** -0.571***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
RR shock -0.314*** -0.332*** -0.330***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
N 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900
Note: This table presents estimates of Equation 1 for the low and high risk portfolio shares, using only house-
holds classified as active investors. All regressions are based on OLS. Each regression includes a set of micro
determinants as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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